Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs
David E. Pozen†
Legal and policy debates about privacy revolve around conflicts between privacy and other goods. But privacy also conflicts with itself. Whenever securing privacy on one margin compromises privacy on another margin, a privacy-privacy
tradeoff arises.
This Essay introduces the phenomenon of privacy-privacy tradeoffs, with particular attention to their role in NSA surveillance. After explaining why these
tradeoffs are pervasive in modern society and developing a typology, the Essay
shows that many of the arguments made by the NSA’s defenders appeal not only to
a national-security need but also to a privacy-privacy tradeoff. An appreciation of
these tradeoffs, the Essay contends, illuminates the structure and the stakes of debates over surveillance law specifically and privacy policy generally.

INTRODUCTION
Privacy clashes with important social values. We are told as
much all the time.1 Commentators struggle to reconcile privacy
and security,2 privacy and efficiency,3 privacy and technological
innovation,4 and privacy and free speech,5 among other (real or
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1
See Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of
Everyday Practice 148 (Yale 2012) (“The mainstream public debate about privacy typically portrays privacy as a good infinitely amenable to being traded off against other
goods.”). See also Colin J. Bennett and Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective 23 (MIT 2006) (“The [dominant] privacy paradigm,
based on a conceptualization of distinct private and public realms, almost inevitably leads
the debate to a discussion of how privacy conflicts with social or community values.”).
2
See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity
of Social Life 108 (Stanford 2010) (“One of the most frequently cited conflicts . . . is between privacy and security.”).
3
See id at 109 (“[P]rivacy is regularly challenged by a desire or need for greater
efficiency.”).
4
See, for example, Stewart A. Baker, Skating on Stilts: Why We Aren’t Stopping
Tomorrow’s Terrorism 313–15 (Hoover 2010).
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imagined) antinomies.6 Privacy is constantly being juxtaposed
with competing goods and interests, balanced against disparate
needs and demands. Legal and policy debates about privacy revolve around these tradeoffs.
But privacy also clashes with itself. That is to say, in myriad
social and regulatory contexts, enhancing or preserving privacy
along a certain axis may entail compromising privacy along another axis. If they wish to be more analytically rigorous, theorists and decisionmakers must take such privacy-privacy
tradeoffs into account. If they wish to advance the cause of privacy, civil libertarians must do the same.
Privacy-privacy tradeoffs come in a variety of flavors. Sometimes they are unexpected and unwanted. When EU citizens began exercising their right to be forgotten last year and flooded
Google with “delete me” requests, the deleted links quickly reappeared—together with the relevant search terms—on a website devoted to documenting Internet censorship.7 These citizens’
bid for online privacy thus seems to have triggered the Streisand
effect, “whereby an attempt to suppress a disclosed item of information only draws more attention to it.”8 Other times, privacyprivacy tradeoffs are consciously cultivated and promoted. The
Transportation Security Administration’s PreCheck program invites travelers to “volunteer personal information in advance” if
they wish “to leave on their shoes, belts and light outerwear and
keep their laptops in their bags.”9 Enhanced governmental access to your data can be traded for reduced access to your body
and belongings.
In many cases, privacy-privacy tradeoffs simply follow from
scarce resources and opportunity costs. A tenant on a fixed

5
See generally, for example, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking about You,
52 Stan L Rev 1049 (2000).
6
For a particularly intriguing supplement to the standard list, see generally Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U Chi L Rev 363 (2008).
7
See Jeff John Roberts, “Hidden from Google” Shows Sites Censored under EU’s
Right-to-Be-Forgotten Law (Gigaom, July 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8P26
-H4YL.
8
David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 Harv L Rev 512, 558 n 241 (2013), citing
What Is the Streisand Effect? (The Economist, Apr 15, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/6TDU-ZBFW.
9
Mark Johanson, 7 Questions about TSA’s PreCheck Program Answered (International Business Times, Sept 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/NRD7-QS52. This is a
privacy-convenience tradeoff as well as a privacy-privacy tradeoff.
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budget who spends money soundproofing her walls will have
less to spend on mending her curtains. Alternatively, these
tradeoffs may be caused by behavioral responses and dynamic
feedback effects. Increasing airline passengers’ privacy levels
from X at time 1 to a multiple of X at time 2 may increase the
odds of a terrorist attack, with the consequence that passengers’
privacy levels will be reduced to a fraction of X at time 3. In still
other cases, risk is redistributed across different aspects or
bearers of privacy. By establishing a forensic DNA database,
law-enforcement officials may impair the privacy of everyone
whose DNA is included but protect the privacy of a smaller
group of individuals who will not be needlessly investigated for
the crimes of others. By “stripping network users of any privacy
or anonymity” when they are online,10 an intelligence agency
may deter its analysts from exceeding their investigative mandates and thereby secure a measure of privacy for the rest of society—or at least for the analysts’ love interests.11
While the idea of privacy-privacy tradeoffs appears to be
new to the legal literature,12 the basic logic behind the idea is
not. Criminal law scholars have called attention to the ways in
which police practices advantage certain privacy interests at the
expense of others.13 And theorists in law and other disciplines

10

Baker, Skating on Stilts at 340 (cited in note 4).
See Evan Perez, NSA: Some Used Spying Power to Snoop on Lovers (CNN, Sept
27, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/T69M-SZXG.
12 I have found only one prior work that examines privacy-privacy tradeoffs as
such: a paper by computer scientists reporting the results of a survey that asked participants about their willingness to share with a social network certain information—
photographs, “friend” lists, or their current location—in exchange for notifications about
other users’ photographs in which the participants might appear. See generally Benjamin
Henne and Matthew Smith, Awareness about Photos on the Web and How PrivacyPrivacy-Tradeoffs Could Help, in Andrew A. Adams, Michael Brenner, and Matthew
Smith, eds, Financial Cryptography and Data Security 131 (Springer 2013). See also text
accompanying notes 87–88 (suggesting extensions of this research). The possibility of
privacy-privacy tradeoffs is implicitly recognized in numerous other works. See, for example, Benjamin Wittes and Jodie C. Liu, The Privacy Paradox: The Privacy Benefits of
Privacy Threats *3 (Brookings Institution, May 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P28P
-VPLC (arguing that “technologies often offer privacy with one hand while creating privacy risks with the other”).
13 See generally, for example, Jacqueline E. Ross, Book Review, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69 U Chi L Rev 1501 (2002) (surveying competing techniques used in undercover policing, including several—such as electronic surveillance versus infiltration—that implicate privacy-privacy tradeoffs); William
J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo Wash L Rev 1265
(1999) (criticizing Fourth Amendment law’s focus on privacy as shifting legal protection
from poorer to wealthier suspects).
11
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have begun to explore “security-security tradeoffs,”14 “libertyliberty tradeoffs,”15 “health-health tradeoffs,”16 “democracydemocracy tradeoffs,”17 and other such internal oppositions. Like
security, liberty, health, and democracy, privacy is a complex
normative value embedded in a range of complex social practices. The possibilities for conflict within such a matrix are vast.
Moreover, privacy-privacy tradeoffs are not only widespread in
modern society but also proliferating, as new technologies and
new conceptions of privacy continually generate new ways in
which privacy interests may be violated or vindicated.
This Essay introduces the phenomenon of privacy-privacy
tradeoffs, along with some conceptual tools to help negotiate
them. In keeping with the theme of this Symposium, the Essay
focuses on governmental threats to privacy and in particular on
national-security surveillance. It also begins to sketch links between this subject and questions of institutional design within
the regulatory state. An appreciation of privacy-privacy
tradeoffs, the Essay shows, can clarify and enrich debates over
the activities of the NSA as well as over privacy policy generally.
Reconceptualizing these debates as pitting privacy against privacy enables more productive consequentialist and critical analysis, and it might even help to disentrench some of the political
and ideological divisions that have hardened around privacyversus-security, privacy-versus-technology, and other conventional frameworks.
This Essay offers no general solution to sort out these
tradeoffs, as I am doubtful that there is one to be had. I have become increasingly convinced, however, that we cannot make
headway on many privacy problems unless we understand the
privacy-privacy tradeoffs at stake. The Essay aspires, above all,
to frame and provoke ongoing discussion toward that end.

14 See, for example, Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding
Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 Cal L Rev 301, 318–23 (2009).
15 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, A New Deal for Civil Liberties: An Essay in
Honor of Cass R. Sunstein, 43 Tulsa L Rev 921, 922–25 (2008).
16 See generally, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U Chi
L Rev 1533 (1996).
17 See, for example, Robert E. Goodin, Global Democracy: In the Beginning, 2 Intl
Theory 175, 179 n 11 (2010).
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I. PLURALISTIC PRIVACY
Before turning to the subject of tradeoffs, I need to say a few
words on the subject of privacy. Setting forth a crisp definition of
the latter turns out to be remarkably difficult to do. In contemporary discourse, privacy has become associated with “freedom
of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over personal information, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations,” among other things.18 It is a commonplace in the
privacy literature to bemoan the “bewildering variety of meanings” the concept has accumulated.19 About the only “point on
which there seems to be near-unanimous agreement,” Professor
Helen Nissenbaum observes, “is that privacy is a messy and
complex subject.”20
In recent years, many privacy theorists have made what we
might call a pluralistic turn: rejecting approaches to privacy that
strive to identify its essence or its core characteristics and settling,
instead, “on an understanding of privacy as an umbrella term that
encompasses a variety of related meanings.”21 The concept of privacy, on this view, comprises a web of overlapping conceptions,
dimensions, and values, none of which necessarily has lexical priority over any other. Professor Daniel Solove’s work is exemplary
in this regard. Drawing on philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances, Solove forcefully argues against conceptualizing privacy through a priori generalizations, such as

18

Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy 1 (Harvard 2008).
Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy: Rethinking Civil Liberties in the Digital Age 8
(Oxford 2015). See also, for example, Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89
Georgetown L J 2087, 2087 (2001) (“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings,
that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”).
20 Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context at 67 (cited in note 2). Notwithstanding these
laments, the “reductionist” position—which maintains that ostensible privacy claims are
reducible to other sorts of claims and would be more fruitfully analyzed in nonprivacy
terms—has largely lost out in academic as well as popular commentary. See generally
Privacy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Aug 9, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/VUZ2-WLXD (explaining that, against the reductionists, “most theorists
take the view that privacy is a meaningful and valuable concept”).
21 Richards, Intellectual Privacy at 9 (cited in note 19). See also Privacy at § 3.6
(cited in note 20) (discussing a range of theorists who “defend the view that privacy has
broad scope, inclusive of the multiple types of privacy issues described by the [US Supreme] Court, even though there is no simple definition”).
19
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necessary and sufficient conditions, in favor of a pluralistic, “bottom up” approach focused on “privacy problems.”22
Reviewing the extensive treatments of privacy in legal
scholarship and judicial opinions, Solove finds that at least six
different understandings of privacy have emerged: (1) “the right
to be let alone,” (2) “limited access to the self,” (3) “secrecy,”
(4) “control over personal information,” (5) “personhood,” or “the
protection of one’s personality, individuality, and dignity,” and
(6) “intimacy,” or “control over . . . one’s intimate relationships or
aspects of life.”23 Solove might have added still more items to the
list. Professor Kendall Thomas, for instance, has discerned “zonal,
relational, and decisional” paradigms of privacy in Supreme
Court case law, focused respectively on preserving “space[s] of civil sanctuary,” “freedom to associate with others in intimate relation,” and autonomous decisionmaking on certain important matters.24 Professor Julie Cohen has recently urged that privacy be
reimagined, in “postliberal” terms, as a resource for the development of critical subjectivity and “an interest in breathing room to
engage in socially situated processes of boundary management.”25
In an effort to bring some analytic order to this sprawl,
Solove has developed a taxonomy of widely recognized privacy
problems. It is worth reproducing the taxonomy in full:
1. Information collection
Surveillance
Interrogation
2. Information processing
Aggregation
Identification
Insecurity
Secondary use
Exclusion
3. Information dissemination
Breach of confidentiality
Disclosure
Exposure
Increased accessibility
22 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 8–9 (cited in note 18). For an expanded discussion of this pluralistic understanding of privacy, see id at 39–77.
23 Id at 12–37.
24 Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum L Rev 1431, 1443–
48 (1992).
25 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self at 126, 149 (cited in note 1).
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Blackmail
Appropriation
Distortion
4. Invasion
Intrusion
Decisional interference26
For the purposes of this Essay, it does not much matter
whether these classifications are compelling in all particulars27
or whether the messiness and complexity of privacy will ever be
fully elucidated. The important thing to see is how many interests and concerns are now taken to be privacy interests and concerns. Solove, to reiterate, has identified no fewer than six broad
conceptions of privacy and sixteen broad categories of “privacy
problems that have achieved a significant degree of social recognition.”28 This capaciousness exacerbates the dilemma of privacyprivacy tradeoffs. The more sorts of privacy claims that there
are, the greater the risk that there will be conflicts among
them.29
Just consider the first two categories in Solove’s taxonomy:
surveillance and interrogation. Each activity, Solove explains,
may cause privacy harms. But it does not follow that the privacy
harms they cause will always or typically be additive. Surveillance and interrogation are both techniques used by lawenforcement officials to gather information that may be relevant
for identifying and punishing criminals. A police force that devotes significant resources to surveillance will have fewer resources left over—and perhaps less of a practical need—for interrogation.30
As
privacy
problems,
surveillance
and
interrogation are plausible substitutes. Tightening the rules
on criminal interrogation, consequently, could lead to a net
26 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 10–11 (cited in note 18). See also id at 101–70
(elaborating this taxonomy).
27 For a critique of Solove’s approach, see M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy
Harm, 86 Ind L J 1131, 1139–42 (2011).
28 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 101–02 (cited in note 18).
29 See Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin, Introduction: Basic Rights and Beyond, in Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin, eds, Global Basic Rights 1, 23 (Oxford
2009) (“The more rights there are, the greater the danger that we will face ‘rights-rights
trade-offs.’”).
30 On similar logic, former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover reportedly “opposed the
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, believing the intelligence capabilities of the FBI to be sufficient to locate any risk that might emerge from that community.” Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S Cal L Rev 575, 609 n
126 (2010).
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decrease in a community’s privacy insofar as it pushes the police
to intensify surveillance.
Or consider disclosure and blackmail. Again, each is a widely recognized menace to privacy. Yet blackmail, as Solove defines it, is nothing more or less than the threat of disclosure of
truthful personal information.31 And that threat has no force
once a given datum has become public. Voluntary divulgences
about one’s personal life can be self-protective for this reason.
Such divulgences, on some accounts, are a defining feature of
our digital age. The rise of what Professor Bernard Harcourt
calls the “expository society”—in which people eagerly give up
their most intimate details “in a mad frenzy” of “texts, Tweets,
emoticons and Instagrams, e-mails and Snapchats, Facebook
posts, links, shares and likes”32—has had at least one happy side
effect for our collective privacy, in that it has rendered various
forms of blackmail otiose.
Other privacy-privacy tradeoffs will be more complex,33 but
these examples suffice to make the point. Solove offers his taxonomy to “enable courts and policymakers to better balance privacy against countervailing interests.”34 The very breadth of the
taxonomy underscores the need to start balancing privacy
against itself.
II. TRADEOFF TYPES AND TRIGGERS
When exactly does the need to balance privacy against privacy arise, though? And what might these balancing efforts look
like? Although a comprehensive answer is well beyond the scope
of this Essay, drawing some distinctions among privacy-privacy
tradeoffs can help illuminate the structure of the problem.35
31

Solove, Understanding Privacy at 105 (cited in note 18).
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Expository Society: Spectacle, Surveillance, and Exhibition in the Neoliberal Age of Big Data *11 (Sciences Po Faculty Workshop in Political
Theory, Nov 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5BVF-9V3F.
33 To take just one recurring case suggested by Solove’s earlier work, facilitating
public access to documents that are held in government databases might reduce the privacy problem of “exclusion,” or “the failure to provide individuals with notice and input
about their records,” while increasing the risk that personal information will be disclosed
or exposed to others. Solove, Understanding Privacy at 134 (cited in note 18). See also
Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age
150–54 (NYU 2004) (discussing potential tensions between privacy and open-access
laws).
34 Solove, Understanding Privacy at 10 (cited in note 18).
35 For a valuable typology of risk-risk tradeoffs, see John D. Graham and Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener,
32
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Governmental entities and corporations maintain countless
policies that have implications for privacy.36 A decision to
change, or not to change, any given policy can occasion at least
five basic types of privacy-privacy tradeoffs. These types are not
mutually exclusive and may appear in combination. The
tradeoffs themselves may be intentional or inadvertent, highly
visible or largely unseen.
First, a policy may shift privacy burdens or benefits from
one group in the population to another. If the New York City Police Department relies on ethnic profiling to redeploy agents
from streets and sidewalks to Islamic cultural centers, Muslim
New Yorkers may experience a (significant) loss of privacy while
everyone else experiences a (marginal) gain. We can call these
sorts of privacy-privacy tradeoffs distributional tradeoffs.37
Second, risk may be shifted not only among groups that suffer privacy harms but also among groups that cause harm to a
certain privacy interest—among privacy violators as well as victims. An e-reader such as Amazon’s Kindle prevents my fellow
riders on the subway from seeing what I am reading, but it tells
Amazon in great detail about what I am reading, including how
many seconds I have spent on each page.38 We can call these
sorts of tradeoffs directional tradeoffs, to reflect that the privacy
threat has been redirected so that it comes from one source instead of another.
Third, a policy may shift privacy risk across time periods.
This is part of the privacy bargain offered by programs such as
PreCheck that do intensive vetting of prospective passengers,
eds, Risk versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment 1, 22–25
(Harvard 1995). For a valuable “conceptual map” of health-health tradeoffs, see Sunstein,
63 U Chi L Rev at 1538–42 (cited in note 16).
36 Again, governmental decisions are the focus of this Essay, although privacyprivacy tradeoffs commonly arise from individual and corporate decisions as well.
37 Professor Strahilevitz provides a wide-ranging survey of privacy policy’s distributive implications, with numerous examples that may involve privacy-privacy tradeoffs, in
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 Harv L Rev
2010 (2013).
38 See Richards, Intellectual Privacy at 128–29 (cited in note 19). Benjamin Wittes
and Jodie Liu emphasize more generally that digital technologies “we commonly think of
as privacy-eroding may, in fact, enhance privacy from the people in our immediate surroundings,” even as they erode privacy vis-à-vis “large physically remote entities” such
as corporations and governments. Wittes and Liu, The Privacy Paradox at *10 (cited in
note 12). See also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 Harv L Rev 476, 512–17 (2011) (presenting the telephone as an example of how emerging technologies may enable new modes of surveillance while allowing
for the circumvention of others).
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customers, employees, or the like at a threshold stage, on the
promise of reduced scrutiny thereafter.39 Maximalist privacy policies, as suggested in the Introduction’s airline example,40 may
lead to unintended intertemporal transfers (and prove selfdefeating) inasmuch as they invite bad outcomes, which then
generate demand for new policies that substantially slash privacy.41 We can call these sorts of tradeoffs dynamic tradeoffs.
Fourth, a policy may shift risk across different privacy interests. Recall the six conceptions of privacy and sixteen categories of “privacy problems” that Professor Solove has identified.42
Whenever a policy enhances privacy on one of these dimensions
while eroding it on another, a tradeoff arises. Although the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy allowed gay service members
to conceal information about their intimate lives, it arguably
undermined other aspects of their privacy by spotlighting the
question of sexual orientation and constricting their ability to
control their social identities.43 Although a policy requiring that
police officers wear body cameras may advance various privacy
goals through averted police misconduct—for instance, by reducing the number of unreasonable searches or seizures—those
same cameras raise privacy concerns for the suspects, victims,
bystanders, and officers who may be captured on film.44 Targeting one privacy risk creates a new, countervailing risk. We can
call these sorts of tradeoffs dimensional tradeoffs.
39 See text accompanying note 9 (describing PreCheck). PreCheck also trades off
different privacy interests (roughly, personal information for physical intrusion) and
may tend to intensify screening of non-PreCheck passengers—making it a dynamic, dimensional, and distributional tradeoff all at once.
40 See text accompanying notes 9–10.
41 Individual efforts to preserve privacy can likewise have unintended dynamic effects. In the area of surveillance, for example, a person’s use of encryption may shield the
content of her communications from the gaze of the intelligence services but flag her as a
suspicious type, deserving of future scrutiny. See Mathew J. Schwartz, Want NSA Attention? Use Encrypted Communications (InformationWeek, June 21, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/XX84-RSWZ (discussing actions that NSA analysts are authorized to
take when encryption is encountered).
42 See text accompanying notes 23–26.
43 See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 Yale L J 485, 544–50 (1998) (analyzing the “evasive” advantages and disadvantages of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell). See also
text accompanying notes 23–25 (noting the existence of decisional, dignitarian, and relational, as well as secrecy-centered, conceptions of privacy).
44 See Rachel Weiner, Police Body Cameras Spur Privacy Debate (Wash Post, Nov
10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/PT9L-MJUK (discussing these privacy concerns
and noting the American Civil Liberties Union’s ambivalent support for on-body police
cameras).
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Certain dimensional tradeoffs recur regularly. State interventions to secure legal privacy rights, for instance, tend to butt
up against people’s confidentiality and concealment interests.
Government surveillance aspires to deter a wide range of privacy crimes through the very act of impinging on privacy.45 A call
to the police after a burglary may well bring more unwelcome
visitors into one’s home. And government subsidies that enhance
recipients’ so-called decisional privacy often come with an informational privacy “tax.” The Hyde Amendment has restricted the
Department of Health and Human Services from funding abortion care for Medicaid recipients since 1976.46 This refusal to
subsidize marks a defeat for decisional privacy in that it impedes women’s exercise of their right to obtain an abortion; but
it carries at least some benefit for informational privacy in that
once the government is no longer paying for abortions, there is
necessarily less official data collection about who obtains them
and under what circumstances.
Finally, when the traded-off risks are understood to be not
just factually but qualitatively distinct from or even incommensurate with each other, we might say that a dimensional
tradeoff rises to the level of a domain tradeoff. The privacy interests on either side of the ledger, in such a case, seem to implicate different domains of value. They “cannot be aligned along a
single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these [interests] are best characterized.”47 Perhaps the privacy problems caused by abortion restrictions and
government record keeping are immiscible in this way.48

45

See Part III.B.
Act of Sept 30, 1976 § 209 (“Hyde Amendment”), Pub L No 94-439, 90 Stat 1418,
1434. I thank Lior Strahilevitz for suggesting this example, among others.
47 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779,
796, 798 (1994) (emphasis omitted) (defining incommensurability in a “very thin” sense).
The possibility that privacy encompasses distinct domains of value brings us back to debates over the concept’s utility and coherence. Wherever one stands on those debates,
however, it seems to me that a descriptively and phenomenologically accurate typology—
one that captures how privacy is understood and experienced in contemporary society—
must admit these tradeoffs. See Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1552 (cited in note 16) (observing that “problems of incommensurability . . . play a large role in health-health comparisons” and “certainly” cannot be eliminated).
48 But see Matthew B. Kugler, Affinities in Privacy Attitudes: A Psychological Approach to Unifying Informational and Decisional Privacy *11–39 (unpublished manuscript, July 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JVZ6-VPFZ (exploring psychological
connections between decisional and informational privacy); Neil M. Richards, Book Review, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Georgetown L J 1087, 1102–21 (2006)
46
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Privacy-privacy tradeoffs might also be parsed, in more
functional terms, according to the triggers or mechanisms that
explain their existence. Some interventions to safeguard one
form of privacy will jeopardize another form of privacy quite directly when implemented, as in the case of police body cameras.49 Other interventions will give rise to tradeoffs more indirectly, through the adaptive behavior they induce. Regulators or
regulated parties may respond to a new measure by shifting to
different practices that impinge on privacy in different ways.50
Vulnerable actors may overestimate a measure’s benefits and be
lulled into reducing their own precautions.51 Strategic actors
may exploit the rigidities caused by privacy protections in ways
that render them unsustainable.52 Policymakers may also bring
about or exacerbate privacy-privacy tradeoffs through ignorance of
relevant facts or future contingencies; through analytic error, including selective attention to a certain aspect of privacy to the neglect of others;53 or through the standard opportunity costs associated with devoting limited resources to any particular concern.
The foregoing points can be distilled into a simple schematic. Although just one of many ways to carve up the landscape,54

(exploring doctrinal and theoretical connections between decisional and informational
privacy).
49 See Samuel J. Rascoff and Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis:
Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U Chi L Rev 1763,
1771–75 (2002) (classifying such tradeoffs as “direct risk tradeoffs” and noting that paradigmatic examples include “the negative side effects associated with medical interventions”).
50 See text accompanying notes 29–30 (giving the hypothetical example of a police
force ramping up surveillance in response to new restrictions on interrogation).
51 See Rascoff and Revesz, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1777–78 (cited in note 49), quoting W.
Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 225 (Oxford
1992) (discussing “lulling effects,” whereby the “introduction of a safety measure . . . can
have the effect of ‘produc[ing] misperceptions that lead consumers to reduce their safety
precautions because they overestimate the product’s safety’”).
52 See text accompanying notes 9–10 (noting possible iterated interactions between
airline passengers’ privacy levels and terrorist threats).
53 See Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes 125–26 (Norton 1999) (explaining that “the problem of selective attention”
can both generate and obscure rights-rights and risk-risk tradeoffs); Robert K. Merton, The
Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 Am Sociological Rev 894, 898–
902 (1936) (identifying ignorance, error, and the “imperious immediacy of interest” as
pervasive causes of unintended consequences).
54 Among other possibilities, each of the tradeoff types outlined above might be further sliced on the basis of the number of persons affected, the role of governmental versus nongovernmental actors, or the expected probability and salience of privacy gains
and losses. Be that as it may, I believe these categories capture key structural features of
privacy-privacy tradeoffs and so supply a useful if limited tool kit for analyzing this heterogeneous phenomenon.
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this typology furnishes a serviceable conceptual map and gives a
sense of the regularity, as well as the endless variety and fluidity, of privacy-privacy tradeoffs.
TABLE 1. A TYPOLOGY OF PRIVACY-PRIVACY TRADEOFFS
Tradeoff Type

Traded-Off Element

Distributional

Privacy Victims

Directional

Privacy Violators

Dynamic

Time Periods

Dimensional

Privacy Interests

Domain

Qualitatively
Distinct
Privacy Interests

Trigger
Changed Circumstances
Direct Effects
Error
Feedback Effects
Ignorance
Lulling Effects
Opportunity Costs
Substitution Effects

III. PRIVACY-PRIVACY TRADEOFFS AND NSA SURVEILLANCE
We are now in a position to see more clearly both the structure and the stakes of current debates over NSA surveillance reform. As this Part will show, many of the justifications offered
by the NSA’s defenders appeal not only to an alleged nationalsecurity need but also to a privacy-privacy tradeoff.55 These arguments may not be good arguments; their force depends on the
practical realities of surveillance as well as one’s normative
views about which forms of privacy matter most. But the arguments cannot be fairly assessed—or compellingly countered—
without an understanding of the privacy-privacy tradeoffs on
which they are premised.
A.

NSA Analysts versus Ordinary Citizens?

We have already touched on one such argument in defense of
NSA surveillance: the contention that by minimizing the network
privacy of its own employees and contractors, the NSA can safeguard the communications privacy of everyone else.56 Former
55 An additional example of an alleged privacy-privacy tradeoff involving the NSA
is discussed in note 94.
56 See text accompanying notes 10–11.
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NSA general counsel Stewart Baker has proposed that this
tradeoff be made the centerpiece of any new reforms. “The short
answer,” Baker suggests, is that “we can use information technology to make sure that government officials lose their privacy
when they misuse data that has been gathered for legitimate
reasons.”57 Applying this approach, the NSA would “track every
database search made by every user,” and then “follow any distribution of that data outside the system.”58
The attraction of this proposal, apart from the vision of using technology to tame technology, lies in its promise of a stark
distributional tradeoff: NSA analysts’ privacy losses will be We
the People’s gains. As redistributive schemes go, this one is
about as unobjectionable as it gets. Not only do ordinary citizens
outnumber NSA analysts by many orders of magnitude, but the
latter’s privacy interests in being given unfettered access to the
former’s data also seem tenuous at best.
The major limitation of this proposal is that it is unclear
how much privacy would actually be redistributed. Baker seeks
to detect and deter the “misuse” of collected data, such as unlawful disclosures to the media or prurient snooping for personal rather than professional reasons. The privacy problems raised by
such misuse, however, are just a subset of the privacy problems
raised by NSA surveillance, and not necessarily the most concerning subset. Even if implemented to a T, Baker’s proposal
would enhance ordinary citizens’ privacy only with respect to the
rogue behaviors of individual NSA analysts. As a distributional
tradeoff, the proposal seems stark; but as a dimensional
tradeoff, the proposal is quite limited. Although this may be a
trade worth making, it is not responsive to many of the privacy
concerns animating the reform movement.

57

Baker, Skating on Stilts at 321 (cited in note 4).
Id. See also id at 340–41 (expanding on this idea); The Administration’s Use of
FISA Authorities: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 113th Cong, 1st Sess 75 (2013) (“FISA Hearing”) (statement of Stewart A. Baker)
(contending that the “best way” to protect privacy is for “the government to use new
technologies to better monitor government employees who have access to sensitive information”); Jack Goldsmith, The Cyberthreat, Government Network Operations, and the
Fourth Amendment *16 (Brookings Institution, Dec 8, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/Q3KWCNSX, citing David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose between Privacy and Freedom? (Addison-Wesley 1998) (noting, in a
discussion of cybersecurity surveillance, that the government could “employ David Brin’s
strategy of snooping on itself to ensure that it does not go further than necessary in
snooping on its citizens”).
58
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Cybersecurity versus Cybersurveillance?

The argument just reviewed envisions the NSA as the
guardian of Americans’ privacy vis-à-vis internal threats posed
by its own badly behaving employees. Another—more challenging and ambitious—argument made by the NSA’s defenders envisions the agency as the guardian of Americans’ privacy vis-àvis external threats to cybersecurity. “To keep our computer and
telecommunication networks secure,” Professor Jack Goldsmith
contends, “the government will eventually need to monitor and
collect intelligence on those networks using techniques similar
to ones [many] find reprehensible when done for counterterrorism ends.”59 Specifically, the FBI’s general counsel has suggested
that “the government needs to be able to monitor all Internet
communications. All of them.”60
If this argument is correct, it has significant implications for
civil liberties because “[r]elentless assaults on America’s computer networks by . . . foreign governments, hackers and criminals”61 represent a significant threat not only to economic and
defense interests but also to personal privacy. A world in which
America’s computer networks are constantly being exploited is a
world in which Americans’ sensitive data held by banks, hospitals, employers, government agencies, and so forth are at constant risk of being stolen, scrambled, or revealed. Cybersecurity
and privacy are often cast as antagonists,62 for plausible reasons.
The privacy concerns raised by governmental monitoring of all
Internet communications are especially acute. And yet the effective provision of cybersecurity reduces certain sorts of privacy
risks even as it generates others. A sense of security about one’s
online data is a necessary if insufficient condition for the attainment of privacy in the digital age.63
59 Jack Goldsmith, We Need an Invasive NSA (New Republic, Oct 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/PP9F-CRUV. As Goldsmith recounts, the previous director of
the NSA is said to have insisted: “I can’t defend the country until I’m into all the networks.” Id (quoting General Keith Alexander).
60 James A. Baker, National Security and the Constitution *8 (Clarke Forum for
Contemporary Issues, Sept 12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6CU5-JBPW. Baker
sympathetically highlighted this position without committing to it. See id.
61 Goldsmith, We Need an Invasive NSA (cited in note 59), quoting Editorial, Cybersecurity at Risk (NY Times, July 31, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/NS6Z-VQTW.
62 See, for example, Julia Boorstin, Privacy vs. Cybersecurity: The Debate Heats Up
(CNBC, Apr 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/VPF6-27PU (highlighting the privacy
concerns raised by a 2013 cybersecurity bill).
63 See Solove, Understanding Privacy at 126–29 (cited in note 18) (discussing privacy
harms caused by “insecurity,” or lack of protection against data leakage, contamination,
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Is a leading role for the NSA a necessary condition for the
effective provision of cybersecurity, however? It is exceedingly
difficult to answer this question—and therefore to assess this
privacy-privacy tradeoff—because many of the relevant variables are exceedingly complex, counterfactual, or secret. Much
more would need to be known about the nature and scope of the
cybersecurity threat as it relates to privacy, about the NSA’s
distinctive capabilities to combat the threat, and about the privacy protections that would be built into those capabilities. The
distributional, dynamic, and dimensional implications of this
tradeoff all remain hazy at this time.
The NSA has unique empirical insight into these matters
and a political incentive to promote (indeed, to overstate) this
line of argument—one that recasts the agency as the great protector rather than the great usurper of Americans’ privacy. Perhaps the most that can be said with confidence, then, is that the
burden should rest with the NSA to establish the plausibility
and desirability of this privacy-privacy tradeoff, and the agency
has not met that burden.
C.

Governmental Custody of Metadata versus Commercial
Custody of Metadata?

Of all the NSA activities revealed by Edward Snowden, the
one that elicited fiercest domestic backlash was the agency’s ongoing collection of Americans’ telephone call records under § 215
of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.64 Both the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and the President’s Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (“Review Group”) identified the bulk telephony metadata program as

and theft). The security-versus-surveillance tradeoff is by no means confined to the NSA
or to the digital realm, and it has many private sector manifestations as well. At this
writing, for instance, AT&T and other companies are reportedly developing services that
will enable customers to limit their exposure to identity theft by allowing credit card issuers to track, in real time, the geolocation of their phones. See Mikael Ricknäs, AT&T
Wants to Improve Overseas Credit-Card Fraud Prevention via Phone Geolocation
(PCWorld, June 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/M7LK-44SL. Professor William H.
Simon has recently suggested that the severe privacy harms caused by the illicit recording and distribution of people’s intimate conduct “can only be restrained if the wrongdoers can be identified” through government surveillance. William H. Simon, Rethinking
Privacy (Boston Review, Oct 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5YDG-MK47.
64 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”) § 215, Pub L No
107-56, 115 Stat 272, 287–88, codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 1861–62.
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a significant threat to privacy with limited security benefits.65 To
mitigate this threat, the Review Group urged, the government
should switch to a system in which the metadata reside either
with the communications providers—AT&T, Verizon, and their
ilk—or with a newly created independent entity; the NSA would
still be able to “query” the information pursuant to an order
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), but it
would no longer be the custodian.66 “This change,” the Review
Group claimed, would “greatly reduce the intake of telephony
meta-data by NSA” and “therefore also dramatically . . . reduce
the risk, both actual and perceived, of government abuse.”67 The
USA FREEDOM Act of 201568 has now enacted a version of this
recommendation into law, with the metadata to be held by the
phone companies.69
According to the separate statements filed by two PCLOB
members, however, an overlooked privacy-privacy tradeoff
threatens to diminish if not reverse the privacy gains that this
reform is supposed to supply. Having the communications providers retain their customers’ metadata in an NSA-friendly format, PCLOB member Rachel Brand wrote, “could increase privacy concerns by making the data available for a wide range of
purposes other than national security.”70 In a blog post elaborating
on these concerns, Benjamin Wittes argued that “[i]nstead of having one actor with a metadata database—an actor that is politically accountable and subject to all kinds of oversight mechanisms”—

65 See Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court *12 (PCLOB, Jan 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ST8L-XRQJ (“The Board
also has analyzed the Section 215 program’s implications for privacy and civil liberties
and has concluded that they are serious.”); Liberty and Security in a Changing World:
Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies *113 (Dec 12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/H9V2-KS4N
(stating that the “enormity of the breach of privacy caused by queries of [a] hypothetical
mass information database,” of the sort that could conceivably be compiled under § 215,
“dwarfs the privacy invasion occasioned by more traditional forms of investigation”).
66 Liberty and Security in a Changing World at *25, 115–19 (cited in note 65).
67 Id at *118.
68 Pub L No 114-23, 129 Stat 268.
69 USA FREEDOM Act §§ 101–07, 129 Stat at 269–74, to be codified at 50 USC
§ 1861. The USA FREEDOM Act does not, however, impose new data-retention obligations on the phone companies beyond what is already required by federal law.
70 Report on the Telephone Records Program at *213 (cited in note 65). Such an approach, PCLOB member Elisebeth Collins Cook likewise suggested, “would pose separate and perhaps greater privacy concerns.” Id at *218.
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the Review Group’s proposal could “proliferat[e] the number of
people and organizations with access” to sensitive data.71
As these critiques suggest, keeping the metadata with the
private sector or with some newly created entity might merely
shift the locus (and expand the scope) of the privacy threat, at
least if the implementing rules are not well designed. A private
sector model might also open the door to a richer array of queries if additional phone companies are included in the program72
or if the companies collect certain information, such as cell
phone location data, that the NSA did not collect in bulk. And it
might do this while lulling ordinary citizens into believing the
privacy threat has been resolved. Add this all up, and one may
wonder whether the Review Group has proposed “a bad trade
purely in civil liberties terms.”73
The answer depends on normative as well as empirical considerations. Critics have characterized the Review Group’s proposal as redistributing privacy risk from suspected terrorists’
associates to the general population. Yet in the absence of a new
third-party database or new data-retention requirements, it is
not clear that this reform will in fact generate or exacerbate significant privacy vulnerabilities.74 Moreover, any distributional
tradeoff that does occur is best understood, I believe, as part of a
larger directional and domain tradeoff: although it creates possibilities for privacy infringements by commercial actors, dispersing the metadata makes it more difficult for the NSA to engage in comprehensive data mining of Americans’ phone records
71 Benjamin Wittes, Assessing the Review Group Recommendations: Part II (Lawfare, Dec 26, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/DJ3Z-BG2G. As Wittes noted, the recommendation that telephony metadata be held outside the NSA “played in the press as
the heart and soul of the Review Group report.” Id.
72 See Charlie Savage, Power Wars: Inside Obama’s Post-9/11 Presidency 608 (Little,
Brown 2015) (observing that the Obama administration’s § 215 reform plan “would make
the NSA more powerful” in one sense, “by permitting the government to include,” for the
first time, “every phone company in the revamped program”).
73 Wittes, Assessing the Review Group Recommendations (cited in note 71). See also, for example, NSA Counterterrorism Program, 114th Cong, 1st Sess, in 161 Cong Rec
S 2708 (daily ed May 7, 2015) (statement of Senator Mitch McConnell) (contending that
“[i]n addition to making us less safe, the USA FREEDOM Act would make our privacy
less secure” by leaving the metadata with companies that lack the NSA’s “rigorous controls”); Bruce Schneier, Let the NSA Keep Hold of the Data (Slate, Feb 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UCQ3-C6BD (arguing that the Review Group’s proposal “makes
things worse in several respects” from the perspective of privacy and data security).
74 See Lauren Carroll, Lindsey Graham: Freedom Act Means Less Privacy for Phone
Records (PolitiFact.com, June 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3RXF-BKJC (disputing Senator Lindsey Graham’s claim that the USA FREEDOM Act “undercut[s] privacy”
because the law “does not affect how the companies themselves maintain their records”).
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or to apply that capacity toward a coercive end. A classic liberal
fear of centralized authoritarian power has been given precedence over a relatively novel fear of decentralized corporate
abuse.
Even if critics like Wittes have neglected this important aspect of the “trade,” however, they are right that the Review
Group’s recommendations could give rise to a privacy-privacy
tradeoff—and that, in consequence, it cannot be taken for granted that their adoption would be a boon for privacy. The Review
Group’s failure to engage with this issue is particularly striking
given that its report endorses a holistic approach to risk management, based on the insight that “multiple risks are involved”
in NSA surveillance policy, from security to commerce to privacy, “and all of them must be considered.”75 Faithfully applying
this approach requires considering the interactions among not
only different categories of risk but also different risks within
the category of privacy.
D. Machines versus Humans (and Bulk Collection versus
Reading and Listening)?
Perhaps the most dramatic privacy-privacy tradeoff concerning NSA surveillance has been suggested by Judge Richard
Posner. It turns on the consequences of having machines, rather
than humans, at the front lines of the agency’s operations. An
opinion piece from 2005 outlines the argument:
The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast
amounts of personal data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their volume, the data are first
sifted by computers, which search for names, addresses,
phone numbers, etc., that may have intelligence value. This
initial sifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a
sentient being), keeps most private data from being read by
any intelligence officer.76
75

Liberty and Security in a Changing World at *15, 46–49 (cited in note 65).
Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis (Wash Post, Dec 21, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/YKX3-WV7T. See also Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance,
and Law, 75 U Chi L Rev 245, 254–56 (2008) (asserting that “[c]omputer searches do not
invade privacy because search programs are not sentient beings” and speculating that “civil
libertarians’ preoccupation with warrants” might prove harmful “to civil liberties if it induces legislation to expand the reach of the criminal law”). For a similar argument on how
computer searches may substitute for more invasive techniques, see Julian Sanchez, The
76
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Posner makes two distinct claims about privacy in this passage. First, he contends that machines cannot by themselves invade privacy; only other humans can. (A related position maintains that the collection and processing of metadata cannot, in
themselves, invade privacy because metadata do not include
“content.”77) This claim is disputable, but it would be of little
moment if the NSA’s machine collection and processing of private communications led to more of those communications being
reviewed by an intelligence officer—an activity that, Posner implicitly concedes, plainly does invade privacy. Hence the importance of Posner’s second claim, which is that the NSA’s vacuuming up of personal data through electronic means can
safeguard privacy by reducing the amount of human review.
Restated in more general terms, the suggested tradeoff is
that tighter limits on what sorts of data the NSA can electronically collect or mine at the front end might lead to looser—and
more privacy-invasive—investigatory practices at the back end.
Beyond the automated “sifting” function identified by Posner, a
variety of mechanisms could conceivably produce such a result.
In the absence of bulk metadata collection under § 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act, for instance, the NSA might seek to identify
suspected foreign terrorists’ American associates in a less surgical manner, through ever-widening wiretaps instead of link
analysis and contact chaining.78 Tighter limits on what may be
acquired under any particular authority, such as § 215, could
push NSA officers to submit broader warrant applications to the
Pinpoint Search: How Super-Accurate Surveillance Technology Threatens Our Privacy
(Reason.com, Jan 10, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/7WFR-TWQU (quoting Professor
Jeffrey Rosen for the view that high-tech “pinpoint” searches should be embraced by the
privacy community inasmuch as they can “find illegal activity” without recourse to invasive physical searches).
77 See, for example, Geoff Nunberg, Calling It ‘Metadata’ Doesn’t Make Surveillance
Less Intrusive (NPR, June 21, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/PD6X-3DED (quoting
Senator Dianne Feinstein as defending the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata program on
the ground that “[t]here is no content involved”).
78 Government lawyers have gestured at this tradeoff in their public statements
about the § 215 program. See, for example, Robert S. Litt, Privacy, Technology and National Security: An Overview of Intelligence Collection *10 (Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, July 19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/94AS-BTGU (“The collection [of
metadata] has to be broad to be operationally effective, but it is limited to non-content data. . . . Only the narrowest, most important use of this data is permitted; other uses are
prohibited. In this way, we protect both privacy and national security.”). According to
Stewart Baker, under its “collection-first model,” the NSA has been wiretapping American citizens at a fraction of the rate that its European counterparts have been wiretapping their own citizens. FISA Hearing, 113th Cong, 1st Sess at 77–78 (cited in note 58)
(statement of Stewart A. Baker).

2016]

Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs

241

FISC79 or to make greater use of other legal authorities, as by
expanding the targeting of non-US persons under § 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197880 (FISA) on the
hope or expectation that this would yield more “incidental” collection of US persons’ communications.81 Barriers to domestic
acquisition could likewise lead to more aggressive “privacy
shopping,” whereby the NSA relies on foreign partners to obtain
data it cannot lawfully or efficiently obtain on its own.82
In short, it is not implausible to worry that collection limits
could backfire or to think that the more (meta)data the NSA has
at its disposal, the less it will need officers to review intercepted
communications. Big data analytics can take over, to some extent, from old-fashioned listening and reading. And if one deems
the latter to be an especially or uniquely significant privacy
problem, then one can arrive at the unsettling paradox of preferring that the NSA “collect it all”83 on privacy grounds.
I want to stress that there are many reasons why this paradox may not obtain in practice and why civil libertarians may be
wise to decline to trade bulk collection for the hope of downstream privacy benefits. Unless paired with exacting rules regarding how and when data may be accessed, used, shared, and
stored—and even if paired with such rules—“collecting it all”
could easily lead to more rather than fewer privacy invasions of
the sort Posner would recognize. Posner’s conception of what
counts as a privacy invasion could also, of course, be rejected in
79 See Julian Sanchez, Leashing the Surveillance State: How to Reform Patriot Act
Surveillance Authorities *24 (Cato Institute, May 16, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z7B5-FNGV (“While it may be tempting to insist that a court order be
obtained for all records, this could have the perverse consequence of yielding greater intrusion, as agents would have an incentive to sweep as broadly as possible in a single
order . . . even when more-limited records would suffice.”).
80 Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified as amended in various sections of Titles
18 and 50. Section 702 of FISA was added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 101,
Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, 2437–48, codified as amended at 50 USC § 1881a.
81 See Report on the Surveillance Program Operated pursuant to Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act *82 (PCLOB, July 2, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/J42S-RRBZ (discussing the “incidental” collection of US persons’ communications and noting that, under the NSA’s PRISM program, such collection “is not accidental, nor is it inadvertent”).
82 See Didier Bigo, et al, Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States
and Its Compatibility with EU Law *17, 32 (CEPS, Nov 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/6CDD-GKYL (describing “privacy shopping” as a technique by which intelligence agencies such as the NSA “exchang[e] targets of surveillance in order to use
the loopholes created in many national privacy laws”).
83 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, For NSA Chief, Terrorist Threat Drives Passion to ‘Collect It All’ (Wash Post, July 14, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Z5WP-DFMJ.
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principle. And stringent legal limits on what sorts of data the
NSA can acquire and analyze might be designed in ways that
are both operationally workable and difficult to circumvent. In
any event, the burden must rest heavily on the NSA to show
that its voracious collection practices have been a net plus for
privacy, relative to a world in which the agency faced greater ex
ante constraints. A decade after Posner’s provocation, this burden, too, remains to be met.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
Although it only scratches the surface of debates over surveillance reform, the discussion in Part III demonstrates that
privacy-privacy tradeoffs are deeply (if sometimes inconspicuously) woven into the fabric of these debates. We would find the
same thing, Parts I and II indicate, in virtually any area of information policy. How might we build on these observations?
When privacy-privacy tradeoffs cannot be avoided, how might
they be managed? Some basic suggestions emerge from the
analysis above.
First, scholars, advocates, and government officials could do
a much better job of identifying and confronting privacy-privacy
tradeoffs as tradeoffs. “Unless decisionmakers consider the full
set of outcomes associated with each effort to reduce risk,” policy
theorists have warned, “they will systematically invite [risk-risk]
tradeoffs.”84 This warning applies equally in the privacy context.
Managing privacy-privacy tradeoffs requires attention to, and
information about, the full range of privacy interests that may
be affected by a decision, the potential conflicts and congruities
among those interests, and the expected distribution and degree
of privacy gains and losses. It cannot simply be assumed that
because a certain measure causes privacy harm, even serious
harm, privacy would be enhanced overall by jettisoning the
measure. Privacy policies and problems cannot be assessed in
isolation.
Second, the pluralistic turn in privacy theory may need to
be qualified or supplemented in certain respects to accommodate
the reality of privacy-privacy tradeoffs. Pluralistic theories of
84 Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 2 (cited in note 35). Professors John Graham and Jonathan Wiener propose numerous factors to inform risktradeoff analysis but caution “that there is no magic recipe. Weighing risk versus risk
will often require both objective information and personal judgment, both expert analysis
and ethical values.” Id at 19.
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privacy, recall, maintain that there are many different valid understandings of privacy and that none has priority over the others.85 The ability to control one’s intimate relationships is no
more or less central to the right of privacy than is the ability to
keep secrets or to keep photographers at bay. The danger of this
approach is that it increases the likelihood of intraprivacy conflicts (by recognizing more claims as privacy claims) while simultaneously depriving us of resources to resolve them (by refusing
to supply a hierarchy of privacy principles). Domain tradeoffs
raise especially acute, and on some accounts insuperable, challenges for consequentialist analysis.
Privacy theory could make itself more relevant to privacy
policy by offering guidance on how to weigh—or, in cases of incommensurability, how to order—various privacy interests when
hard choices must be made among them. These choices are going
to be made, wittingly or unwittingly. The overarching question
for policymakers is whether privacy-privacy tradeoffs can be
handled in a manner that better serves the goals of privacy,
however that ideal is understood and integrated with broader
goals such as social welfare or distributive justice.86 The development of normative frameworks for evaluating privacy-privacy
tradeoffs is an increasingly urgent task for the privacy field.
Third, empirical research could assist in this task. At least
when they do not have an a priori commitment to one privacy
value over another, decisionmakers may find it useful to learn
how affected parties would assess a tradeoff. And at least in
some cases, such learning is possible. Privacy may be notoriously difficult to measure and price in the abstract. But if nothing
else, researchers and regulators can ask people whether and to
what extent they believe an anticipated privacy-privacy tradeoff
would be desirable, or they can design mechanisms that induce
people to reveal their privacy preferences, and then feed the results

85

See text accompanying notes 21–29.
There are numerous ways this ideal might be pursued, from conventional costbenefit analysis, to cost-benefit analysis subject to deontological constraints, to a maximin strategy that seeks to avoid worst possible privacy outcomes or to advance privacy
for the most vulnerable groups, to a risk-reduction strategy that seeks to minimize overall risks to privacy, to a more experimentalist approach that continuously assesses privacy practices and reconsiders privacy goals. Resolving privacy-privacy tradeoffs in a
systematic fashion requires both a substantive assessment of competing privacy interests and a decision procedure into which those assessments can be fed.
86
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into a marginal cost analysis.87 A pair of computer scientists recently tried this and found, through a simple survey, that many
social network users seem eager to trade certain forms of personal
information for greater control over the photographs in which
they appear.88 The very asking of such questions, moreover, may
have the salutary effect of raising anticipated tradeoffs’ salience
and fostering debate.
Fourth, Congress, the courts, and the executive branch can
take steps to drive attention to privacy-privacy tradeoffs. To a
large extent, the question of how to do this is an instance of the
larger question of how to structure regulation of risk-risk
tradeoffs. Scholars have proposed solutions ranging from greater
coordination of risk reduction and cost-benefit analysis through
the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,89 to an interpretive principle allowing agencies to consider
such tradeoffs in the absence of a clear congressional statement
to the contrary,90 to the creation of new congressional committees to handle all risk policy.91 My own view is that the complexity and ubiquity of privacy-privacy tradeoffs counsel against
trusting any single executive branch institution to make significant decisions affecting privacy. Because each has its own interests, culture, and constituency, any given institution is liable to
discount or overlook at least one side of any given tradeoff. It
would be a mistake, on this logic, to house cybersecurity and cybersurveillance responsibilities within the same institution.
Whatever the best institutional design for regulating risk in
general, at least two factors distinguish the case of privacyprivacy tradeoffs. One is that the executive branch already contains numerous entities, such as the PCLOB and the Department
of Homeland Security Privacy Office, with the specific mission of
protecting privacy and civil liberties.92 These entities are obvious
candidates to promote the study of privacy-privacy tradeoffs and
to counter possible biases of national-security decisionmakers.
87 In circumstances in which a uniform policy is not preferred on ethical, legal, or
operational grounds, regulators may be able to go further and give people the option to
resolve their own privacy-privacy tradeoffs, as with the PreCheck program.
88 See note 12.
89 Sunstein, 63 U Chi L Rev at 1537, 1569 (cited in note 16).
90 Id at 1537, 1562–63.
91 Jonathan Baert Wiener and John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in Graham
and Wiener, eds, Risk versus Risk 226, 250–51 (cited in note 35).
92 For an illuminating study of such entities, see generally Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 Cardozo L Rev
53 (2014).
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Reforms that encourage or require these entities to address
privacy-privacy tradeoffs, and that enhance their influence on
their policy process, could help in this cause. Through the USA
FREEDOM Act, Congress has recently instructed a new class of
amici curiae to supply the FISC with “legal arguments that advance the protection of individual privacy.”93 This charge represents a larger delegation of discretion than it might seem, given
the many practical and normative tensions that may arise within the category of privacy, and it cannot sensibly be carried out
without consideration of privacy-privacy tradeoffs.
Another partially differentiating factor is the relationship
between privacy and secrecy. Some of the most pressing threats
to privacy are now thought to come from the most secretive executive agencies and activities, as exemplified by NSA surveillance. Controlling these agencies, and thus controlling the
threat to privacy, requires meaningful congressional oversight
and transparency. And yet the lurking tradeoff is that, unless
designed with care, oversight and transparency can themselves
put privacy at risk. Both involve, sometimes quite literally, more
actors who can see what the regulated party is doing, which in
turn may involve more actors looking at sensitive personal information in the latter’s possession.94 There is no global solution
to this problem, but it can be managed through policies that
provide for partial disclosure, review of representative samples,
de-identification of personal data, and the like.
Finally, it is important to remain on guard against false
tradeoffs, exaggerated countervailing risks, and overly reductive
logic in debates over privacy reform. Scholars have identified
numerous flaws in the conceit of an inherent conflict between
93 USA FREEDOM Act § 401, 129 Stat at 279, to be codified at 50 USC
§ 1803(i)(4)(A).
94 See note 33 (noting a parallel tension between privacy and open-records laws).
Citing this concern, the NSA has declined to tell Congress how many US persons’ communications are “incidentally” collected under FISA § 702 and Executive Order 12333,
3 CFR 200. To derive these figures, the agency maintains, “would actually be invasive of
privacy, because it would require government personnel to spend time scrutinizing the
contents of private messages that they otherwise might never access or closely review.”
Report on the Surveillance Program at *147 (cited in note 81). The NSA’s argument here
strikes me as strained, as it seems likely that there are ways these figures could be estimated—and the NSA’s operations thus subjected to more exacting scrutiny—without
resort to massive human review of collected communications. See Alvaro Bedoya, Executive Order 12333 and the Golden Number (Just Security, Oct 9, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/66BL-BZNM; Timothy B. Lee, The NSA Could Figure Out How Many
Americans It’s Spying on. It Just Doesn’t Want to. (Wash Post, Dec 4, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZH5T-V4JP.
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privacy and security.95 An appreciation of privacy-privacy
tradeoffs provides yet another reason why the “hydraulic conception”96 of the privacy-security relationship is misleading: it
implicitly assumes that the relevant threats to each value come
from the other value, when in reality each may be just as likely
to clash with itself. Incremental gains or losses on any given dimension of privacy have no clear-cut implications for the overall
state of privacy, much less for the overall state of security.
More broadly, as Professor Albert Hirschman has explained,
the allegation that a progressive proposal will have perverse effects is a classic reactionary refrain.97 The mere fact that privacyprivacy tradeoffs are widespread does not imply that existing
practices have struck an appropriate balance or that privacysuperior alternatives are unattainable.98 By attending to these
tradeoffs, we may well find that existing practices are more
problematic for privacy than they had seemed. The privacyprivacy tradeoffs considered in this Essay are not logical truths,
inherent in the concept of privacy. They are practical and socially situated relationships—the product of legal, institutional, and
cultural variables, at least some of which can be tweaked. When
it seems like a privacy-superior move can be made at acceptable
cost to other values, it should be.
CONCLUSION
Privacy theorists have lamented that, from safety to efficiency to entrepreneurship, the “list of privacy’s [perceived]
counterweights is long and growing.”99 Even if certain items on
this list deserve to be removed or demoted, however, one more
must be added: privacy itself. This Essay has explored some of
the many ways in which interventions that strengthen privacy
on one margin can end up weakening it on another.
95 For a powerful critique of necessitarian claims about liberty-security tradeoffs,
see Holmes, 97 Cal L Rev at 312–18 (cited in note 14).
96 Id at 323.
97 Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy 11–
42 (Belknap 1991).
98 See Graham and Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs at 37–39 (cited in note 35)
(discussing the conditions under which “risk-superior moves are achievable”). Nor does it
imply, for that matter, that all unintended consequences will be undesirable. Interventions designed to protect one sort of privacy may turn out to reinforce rather than undercut other sorts of privacy—generating privacy cascades rather than privacy-privacy
tradeoffs. Exploring the conditions under which privacy cascades are more or less likely
to occur might be another fruitful direction for applied privacy theory.
99 Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv L Rev 1904, 1904–05 (2013).
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There is nothing lamentable about this insight; on the contrary, it offers a way forward for theory and advocacy. Privacyprivacy tradeoffs require recognition, study, and debate. Their
existence does not make the pursuit of privacy any less vital or
any more quixotic. When an agency such as the NSA stands to
benefit from an alleged tradeoff, the agency should bear the
burden of establishing the validity of the tradeoff as well as the
value of the “trade.” Privacy-privacy tradeoffs asserted to justify
the status quo must be scrutinized with particular care. But the
problems posed by these tradeoffs are real and enduring. If we
wish to minimize threats to civil liberties in an age of surveillance, we have no choice but to try to make the best privacyversus-privacy choices we can.

